When Is the Past Not the Past? Reflections on Customary Law under
South Africa’s Constitutional Dispensation by Sibanda, Sanele
Human Rights Brief
Volume 17 | Issue 3 Article 6
2010
When Is the Past Not the Past? Reflections on
Customary Law under South Africa’s
Constitutional Dispensation
Sanele Sibanda
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sibanda, Sanele. "When Is the Past Not the Past? Reflections on Customary Law under South Africa’s Constitutional Dispensation."
Human Rights Brief 17, no.3 (2010): 31-35.
31
iNtroductioN
The democratic dispensation in South Africa brought hope and expectations to African communities that had been marginalized from the mainstream of the country’s 
dual legal system. Although officially dubbed a “dual system,”1 
African customary law was subordinated to the position of the 
tolerated but unloved stepchild. The transformation of South 
Africa from a racist, colonial, and subsequently apartheid state2 
to an inclusive, democratic, and constitutional state ushered in 
an era of possibilities widely perceived as breathing new life into 
customary law. The Constitution recognizes customary law as 
one of the “foundation[s] of the South African legal system” by 
placing it on par with the common law.3
During the fifteen years since commencement of the demo-
cratic dispensation, much has been done in the name of reform-
ing and integrating customary law in order to make it comport 
with South Africa’s constitutional project. Without a precise pre-
scription as to what form a constitutionally compliant customary 
law regime would take, scholars have portrayed the process of 
incorporation and reform as a delicate balancing act, seeking to 
promote customary law’s cultural uniqueness as an indigenous 
African enterprise, whilst vigorously protecting and promoting 
women’s right to equality in order to blunt the impact of a seem-
ingly endemic patriarchy.4 How effectively, or even whether, this 
has been achieved remains an open question.
This paper argues that over the last fifteen years, instead of 
producing a reformed, democratic, and culturally attuned system 
of customary law as envisaged at the time of its constitutional 
incorporation, reformers have reproduced the colonial legacy 
that again relegates customary law to a second-tier legal system 
and an instrument of rule and administration. In support of this 
argument, the paper refers to Professor Mahmood Mamdani’s 
thesis that despite post-independence states’ honest attempts to 
reform customary legal systems, many only managed to repro-
duce the colonial legacy through an administratively driven jus-
tice system characterized by a state form he terms “decentralized 
despotism.”5
This paper argues 
that similar to other 
post-independence states, 
South Africa has 
engaged in extensive 
judicial and legislative 
customary law reforms 
that replicate colonial 
relations and structures. 
To do this, the paper is 
divided into five sec-
tions. Section 1 estab-
lishes the historical con-
text of customary law 
within the mainstream 
South African legal sys-
tem, briefly discussing 
the relevant legislation 
and its overarching purpose. In section 2, the paper moves 
on to look at the provisions of the Constitution that relate to 
customary law and, more generally, the importance of the right 
to culture as the constitutional premise of inclusion of custom-
ary law. Section 3 discusses Mamdani’s thesis of decentralized 
despotism and its importance as an analytical tool for assessing 
how customary law is developing in a democratic South Africa.
In section 4, the paper reflects upon some of the substantive 
and institutional developments in customary law in the current 
dispensation, and argues that recent reforms to customary law 
are not encouraging. Referring to specific examples, the paper 
illustrates two ways in which the state has failed to reform cus-
tomary law: firstly, in a way that promotes the right to culture 
upon which it is based; and secondly, in a way that democratizes 
traditional institutions such as the courts to ensure that they 
protect and promote the interests of the communities they serve. 
The final section concludes by raising concerns about the poten-
tial for current reforms to leave people living under customary 
law to be treated as subjects and not citizens.
history of customary laW uNder the  
Black admiNistratioN act
The year 1927 marked a notorious milestone in the history 
of customary law in South Africa; it was the year the Black 
Administration Act (BAA) came into operation.6 The dual sys-
tem of law created under the BAA established a separate and 
inferior system of justice for Africans and left the common law 
system of justice for all other South Africans. The BAA was 
designed to be comprehensive in reach, regulating administra-
tive, judicial, and substantive matters such as the appointment 
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of chiefs; the establishment of courts and their jurisdiction; and 
the determination of legal status, land registration and tenure, 
marriage, and succession. More generally, the BAA was the 
primary instrument for entrenching a uniform system of indirect 
rule in South Africa whereby traditional leaders became state 
agents in administering the affairs of those over whom they were 
appointed to rule.7
The BAA was an effective piece of legislation insofar as 
achieving its purpose to entrench the divide between black and 
white in South Africa. The BAA empowered native commission-
ers and traditional leaders to act with few limits, leaving little 
room to doubt that customary law was indeed an inferior system 
of law that took more than it gave to those subject to its jurisdic-
tion.8 The egregiousness of the BAA ultimately undermined and 
brought into question the very legitimacy of traditional authority 
and customary law.
reBirth of customary laW uNder the  
coNstitutioNal dispeNsatioN
Due to customary law’s tainted colonial history, at the time 
of post-apartheid constitutional negotiations, it was far from a 
foregone conclusion that customary law would become South 
Africa’s constitutionally-ordained “other” system of law. Many 
were skeptical of the constitutional appropriateness of main-
taining a dual legal system, especially as customary law was 
primarily applicable to one racial grouping. Moreover, skeptics 
criticized the traditional structures that were an integral part 
of its operation as undemocratic.9 Despite prevailing concerns 
and misgivings, it was decided that there were ample justifica-
tions to continue recognizing customary law and even grant it 
new elevated status. Firstly, there was the need to incorporate 
on an equal basis a legal system rooted in African cultural 
traditions. Secondly, a majority of South Africans identified 
and conducted their lives in accordance with customary law. 
Thirdly, there was already a functioning customary legal sys-
tem that could become part of the state’s justice and adminis-
trative infrastructure.10
These justifications display a profound appreciation for the 
cultural significance of customary law. In particular, supporters 
of customary law’s incorporation into the Constitution perceived 
its potential to contribute to the mainstreaming of African 
culture and values into South Africa’s legal system. Professor 
Bennett, a leading customary law scholar, has asserted that from 
a constitutional point of view “the recognition and application 
of customary law . . . rests on the right to culture.”11 In support 
of this view, he points out that the South African Bill of Rights 
contains two distinct cultural rights provisions. Section 30 rec-
ognizes the right to use language and participate in the cultural 
life of one’s choice, characterized as an individual right, while 
Section 31 recognizes the right of persons belonging to cultural, 
religious, or linguistic communities to enjoy their cultural prac-
tices, generally characterized as a collective right. Although 
these provisions make no reference to customary law, both are 
generally accepted as supporting the incorporation of customary 
law into the Constitution as they afford all South Africans the 
right to participate in and enjoy a cultural life of their choice.12 
Finally, Section 211(3) requires courts to apply customary law 
when applicable, “subject to the Constitution and any legislation 
that specifically deals with customary law.”
These constitutional provisions are collectively read as hav-
ing sewn the roots for the rebirth of African customary law and 
making it an integral and coequal part of the South African legal 
system. It has thus been on this constitutional platform that 
developments and reforms in customary law have taken place. 
Before considering these reforms and developments, the paper 
briefly discusses Professor Mamdani’s thesis of how decentral-
ized despotism, as one of the main defining features of colonial 
rule relative to customary law, has shaped the post-independence 
reform to this body of law.
deceNtralized despotism, theN aNd NoW
In his highly regarded and equally provocative book, Citizen 
and Subject, Mamdani focuses on the role, function, and struc-
ture of native authorities and customary law within the colonial 
state.13 He calls the state form that colonial powers established 
for dealing with the native question a “decentralized despotism.” 
According to Mamdani, the colonial state was bifurcated:14 on 
the one hand, a centrally organized polity with rights and liber-
ties, ruled directly by an appointed or elected governor almost 
invariably for white settlers;15 on the other, a decentralized 
native state inhabited by indigenous Africans or natives with few 
or no rights and liberties, ruled indirectly via chiefs appointed 
and maintained by the colonial administration.16
The core concept underlying the decentralized despotic state 
was the establishment of a second-tier legal and administrative 
order focused on asserting power over and control of the African 
population.17 To create this state form, the colonial power needed 
to establish institutional and political control over traditional 
authorities by developing a system of indirect rule that “created 
a dependent but autonomous state system of rule, one that com-
bined accountability to superiors with a flexible response to the 
subject population, a capacity to implement central directives 
with one to absorb local shocks.”18 Second, the colonial power 
needed a second-tier legal and administrative order to maintain 
social control. Mamdani explains that “[c]ustomary law was not 
about guaranteeing rights, it was about enforcing custom. Its 
point was not to limit power, but to enable it.”19
Mamdani points out that, although the colonial powers 
realized the potential for certain customs to interfere with the 
colonial enterprise, the colonial state did not concern itself with 
determining the actual content of customary law. Instead, the 
colonialists co-opted and controlled traditional authorities in 
whom they conferred powers to decide the content of customary 
law.20 Despite having lost their original autonomy and power 
base, the traditional authorities were able to focus on dispensing 
customary justice with full knowledge that any challenge to their 
powers would be met with the might of the colonial state.21
Therefore, according to Mamdani, this particular legacy of 
colonialism — decentralized despotism — informed how the 
post-independence state developed its urban-rural/common 
law-customary law divide. This divide goes way beyond the geo-
graphical or spatial; in many ways, it can represent the politics 
of inclusion and exclusion within a particular polity, much like 
2
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racial identity determined who was a citizen versus a subject of 
the colonial state.22
While not accepting Mamdani’s thesis wholesale, much that 
he says about the inherited colonial legacy merits consideration 
as one reflects upon recent customary law developments in 
South Africa. In particular, if one uses Mamdani’s concept of 
decentralized despotism as a tool of analysis to consider the 
extent to which customary law reforms may perpetuate a colo-
nial legacy by continuing customary law and institutions as regu-
latory top-down instruments that enable administrative control 
rather than as a rights-conferring and -reinforcing system of law 
that fosters democracy and citizen participation.
While conceding that the term despotism may not be the 
most appropriate and arguably could overstate the case, there is 
value in using this concept: it more truly engages with the deep-
rooted political and institutional power dynamics that colonial 
policy created when it deployed the decentralized despotic state 
form as its preferred mode of governance.
reflectioN oN maJor deVelopmeNts iN  
customary laW
The primary aim of this section is to reflect upon both sub-
stantive and institutional developments in the area of customary 
law since its incorporation into the current constitutional state.
suBstantive DevelOpments anD tHe enDuRing pRimacy Of 
tHe cOmmOn laW
At the start of the current democratic dispensation, the cus-
tomary laws of marriage and succession were ripe for reform, 
since they were perceived as contributing to the subjugation 
and subordination of women.23 The result was to enact the 
Recognition of the Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 
(RCMA) and the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and 
Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 (RSCA) as read 
with the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. The RCMA pro-
vided for the official recognition of customary marriages, both 
monogamous and polygamous, and affected marriages entered 
into both before and after RCMA’s entry into force.24 Moreover, 
it established and formalized the requirements for a valid cus-
tomary marriage, including the formalities of registration.25 In 
addition, in the context of the customary marriage, it declared 
that women were equal to their husbands for all purposes where 
previously they were regarded as perpetual minors.26 The statute 
also made all customary marriages automatically in commu-
nity of property,27 with the exception of marriages entered into 
before RCMA’s commencement.28 Finally, the RCMA rendered 
the dissolution of a customary marriage actionable only via high 
court proceedings.29
The reform of the customary law of succession was neces-
sitated by the Constitutional Court case Bhe v Magistrate, 
Khayelitsha and Others,30 which declared unconstitutional the 
customary law principle of male primogeniture. Under the cus-
tomary principle, the eldest male descendant of the deceased 
always stood to inherit to the exclusion of all females (includ-
ing the wife) and younger surviving males. After Bhe and the 
RCSA, the surviving wife and all the deceased’s children are 
entitled to inherit their share as determined by the Intestate 
Succession Act 81 of 1987. The RCSA, amongst other things, 
stipulates who may inherit after an intestate death by departing 
from the concept of dependents who may inherit in the tradi-
tional African family structure.
Beyond legally reforming customary law, these statutes 
have gone a long way towards changing the substance of the 
respective customary laws to now closely mirror their common 
law counterparts.31 Apart from some idiosyncratic tinkering to 
accommodate polygyny32 and defining customary law in the 
widest of terms, there is now little substantive or procedural 
difference from the common law when it comes to customary 
marriage and succession.
The purpose of this paper is not to take umbrage with the 
common law or with the act of reformation. Rather, it is con-
cerned with what reforms such as the ones described above do 
to further ossify perceptions of the inferiority of customary law 
vis-à-vis the common law, especially when one considers that 
the Constitution ostensibly creates a dual legal system. What 
is objectionable is not the idea of reform but that this type of 
substitution is termed a reform of customary law.
If one accepts that the continuing relevance of customary 
law is rooted in the constitutional rights to culture, as discussed 
above, then how can these reforms be justified if at heart they 
substitute common law, arguably with its own cultural orien-
tation, for customary law? A knee-jerk response may be the 
so-called “reforms promote the right to equality.” This misses 
the point, however, for the right to equality derives from the 
Constitution and not the common law, and the Constitution 
envisages that customary law will be subject to its terms and not 
those of common law.
Chuma Himonga and Craig Bosch, in a paper that sought to 
encourage debate on the application of customary law, raise an 
important question that resonates with the concerns discussed in 
this paper.33 Concurring with the viewpoint that constitutional 
recognition of customary law is premised on the right to culture, 
the authors ask, “What customary law or version of customary 
law was envisaged by the Constitution?”34 Was it the living/
unofficial or the state/official version of customary law?35 The 
Photograph of artwork at the South African Constitutional Court.
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authors came out emphatically on the side of living custom-
ary law.36 In the present context, this question urges us to ask 
whether and how the reform process that substitutes common 
law for customary law can be said to be upholding and promot-
ing the right to culture. It appears that the reformers failed to 
meaningfully engage with this important question. Surely the 
aim of reform is to engage with customary law on its own terms 
in order to arrive at a more constitutionally compliant version 
rather than to simply replace it with laws that are culturally dis-
connected from those who live under customary law.
Finally, simply terming a reform customary when its sub-
stance is quite clearly not perpetuates the view that customary 
law continues to play a subordinate role in a tiered state legal 
structure wherein customary law can be construed and deployed 
in any manner that suits the needs and convenience of the incum-
bent government. This approach is simply untenable because 
it tends to detract from the promise of the Constitution, which 
provides South Africa’s citizens the right to attain and enjoy full 
citizenship by expressing their cultural rights and conducting 
their affairs in terms of customary law.
institutiOnal DevelOpments: pROBlems WitH tRaDitiOnal 
cOuRts
Fifteen years after the commencement of the democratic era, 
the BAA has still not been repealed in full, although not for want 
of trying. Commencing in 2005, five repeal acts have sought 
to do this but failed.37 The main barrier is that Parliament has 
failed to deliver legislation on traditional courts, despite the fact 
that the South African Law Commission started this project in 
199638 and produced a draft bill for Parliament to consider as 
far back as 2003.39
In 2008, Parliament did introduce a Traditional Courts Bill, 
however in spite of vocal support from the numerous bodies rep-
resenting traditional leaders40 and the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, the bill failed to garner the neces-
sary votes in Parliament. The bill’s problems were numerous, 
including that it envisioned a return to the primacy of traditional 
authorities strongly reminiscent of colonial times, and that it fur-
ther marginalized rural women by leaving representation on the 
courts comprised mainly of hereditary male traditional leaders.
More generally, the extent to which the Traditional Courts 
Bill sought to accommodate the interests of traditional authori-
ties and grant them sweeping powers is concerning.41 As crafted, 
the bill seemed to be centrally concerned with conferring power 
on traditional authorities and enhancing their status, thus lead-
ing one to conclude that powerful political considerations were 
driving the reforms at the expense of democratic principles and 
equal citizenship.42 The bill’s failure to place the community at 
the center of the scheme reconstituting traditional courts is most 
troubling.43 If the traditional courts are to be reconstituted in a 
manner that truly seeks to uphold democracy, then any future 
bill must be organized in a way that clearly regards community 
participation and interests as paramount. It would not be too far-
fetched to say that the bill in the format published placed tradi-
tional authority within the mold of a reformulated, decentralized 
despotic state — only this time functioning within a non-racial, 
inclusive democratic state.
coNclusioN
Political observers must take care not to make categorical 
declarations of failure or success so early in South Africa’s 
democratic project. This caveat, however, should not prevent us 
from evaluating how far South African society has come and 
where it appears to be going. The sound way forward is to seek 
guidance from others who have traversed a similar path, such as 
other former colonies, if only to learn from their mistakes.
Where customary law is concerned, there is a need to pro-
mote constitutional imperatives. There is also a need, however, 
to ensure that the changes are not delivered in a non-inclusive, 
top-down fashion that treats customary law and its institutions as 
outsiders and allows mechanisms of administration and control 
to be used by whomsoever is in power. Much care must be taken 
to ensure that in reforming customary law, we are not reproduc-
ing the bifurcated state form and decentralized despotism char-
acteristic of a bygone era.
If customary law is rightly conceptualized in cultural terms, 
then there is a need to democratize the way it is reformed so that 
those closest to it have the means to determine its content and its 
relevance to their lives, or equally to reject it where it no longer 
resonates with their sense of self. Failing this, customary law 
If customary law is rightly conceptualized in  
cultural terms, then there is a need to democratize  
the way it is reformed so that those closest to it  
have the ways and means to determine its content and  
its relevance to their lives, or equally to reject it where  
it no longer resonates with their sense of self. 
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may continue to be an incredible edifice rooted in its colonial 
legacy that perpetuates marginalization and exclusion of some 
confined to its strictures who remain subjects and sometime citi-
zens. Such a system that forces some members of the population 
to remain prisoners of an oppressive past should not be allowed 
to prevail unquestioned.  HRB
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